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The last half dozen years have witnessed growing talk about a new syn- 
thesis. Linguists and logicians, it is said, are finding common ground in 
the investigation of the logical form of sentences in natural language. Ad- 
verbs, mass terms, proper names, action sentences, belief sentenes, quanti- 
tiers, comparatives and more have all come in for scrutiny. Early results 
have been intriguing. Even more enticing though are the claims that out 
of the synthesis will come illumination of our tacit metaphysical or onto- 
logical assumptions, and perhaps even the solution of major philosophi- 
cal problems. 
But what precisely is logical form? How are we to go about finding 
the logical form of  a sentence? And if we find it, how are we to know that 
we have found it? How are we to know we have gotten an account of  
logical form right? These are questions commonly skirted in studies aimed 
at setting out the logical form of one or another area of language, a They 
are the questions I propose to take up here. 
A central theme will be that there is not a single notion of logical form 
abroad. Instead there are two quite distinct notions, each paired with a 
theory laying claim to the title of a theory of logical form. Thus much of  
what follows will be aimed at pulling the two sorts of theories apart, 
setting out their goals and strategies, and assessing the insight that might 
reasonably be expected from each. But my aim is not entirely expository. 
I also have a pair of  axes to grind. For  it is my view that the pair of pro- 
grams to be analyzed are not merely two possible approaches to construct- 
ing a theory of logical form, they are the only two. Alternative programs 
fall into two categories. Some are variations on the basic ideas of the 
programs sketched, the rest are untenable. Nothing in the present essay 
is aimed at establishing this contention, though in another paper I have 
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tried to take on what I suppose is the most prominent putative alter- 
native, z Ultimately, I suppose, the contention is beyond proof. But if it is 
true it magnifies the importance of my second contention. That is the 
claim that much of the recent talk of synthesis is rooted in confusion. 
Linguists and logicians are engaged in fundamentally different projects. 
And while insights and technical developments in each field may suggest 
innovations in the other, their basic goals diverge. Actually I will urge 
a more radical thesis. On my view, the linguist engaged in the empirical 
study of natural language has no legitimate use for the notion of logical 
form; his use of such terms as 'logical truth' and 'entailment' is, at best, 
Pickwickean. And the logician, whose claim to these terms is solid, has 
no abiding interest in natural language. Indeed, if we construe natural 
language narrowly, excluding the technical locutions forged by logicians, 
then there may well be no logical truths in natural language. 
I I  
We begin with what I will call the Quinean program. The basic ideas be- 
hind the program are older than Quine. One of them, the notion that 
logical truths are simply a species of empirical generalization, found an 
exponent in J. S. Mill. The other, the idea that ordinary language is in- 
adequate to the purposes of logic, traces to Frege. Both ideas had still 
earlier advocates. But in recent years the pair have been aired most 
avidly by Quine. ~ Thus the label. Still, I would not be taken to imply that 
all of what I call Quinean would be endorsed by Quine. Indeed I will 
note several places where Quine's views appear to clash with the view I 
am calling "Quinean." 
"Logic", Quine writes, "chases truth up the tree of grammar." 4 Un- 
packing the epigram will give us a good start at unfolding the program. 
Let us start with a few reflections on truth. 
Central to our notion of truth is the following principle: 
For any sentence of our language, S, the result of substituting 
a name of S for 's' and S itself for 'p' in the schema's is 
true if and only ifp '  yields a truth. 
The principle is not a definition of truth. Nor would it do as an explana- 
tion of the notion to one who feigned not to understand it. 5 But no matter. 
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My claim is only that the principle explesses something true and obvious 
about the notion of truth. Actually, a bit of hedging is called for. We can- 
not let S be any sentence of our language, but only any of its 'eternal' 
sentences, i.e. any of those sentences whose truth value remains constant 
from utterance to utterance. It is only these cases where truth can reason- 
ably be attributed to sentences at all. Also, if we are to avoid paradox, we 
had best restrict our principle to sentences which do not themselves con- 
tain such semantic terms as 'true' and 'false'. 
It is by virtue of  this principle that when we attribute truth to a sen- 
tence we are talking about the world by indirection. 6 Sometimes such in- 
direction is pointless, but not always. The utility of  the truth predicate, 
on the Quinean view, stems from the opportunity it affords to generalize 
in a direction unavailable to simple quantification. Noticing that Tom is 
mortal, Dick is mortal and Harry is mortal, we may generalize the obser- 
vation and advance the thesis that all men are mortal. In so doing we pass 
judgment on all the objects of the universe: each is mortal, if human. No 
need to talk about sentences nor to attribute truth. Suppose, now that we 
go on to observe that Tom is clever or Tom is not clever, that Clarence is 
a crow or Clarence is not a crow, that snow is white or snow is not white. 
Here too there is a generalization to capture. But quantification alone is 
inadequate to the task. 'Tom is clever or Tom is not clever' shares no 
predicates with 'Clarence is a crow or Clarence is not a crow'. What they 
share is a certain linguistic structure. The generalization to be ventured 
is that all sentences with that structure are true. Here we are quantifying 
over sentences and attributing truth to those of a particular structure. 
But while quantifying over sentences our generalization still passes judg- 
ment, though obliquely, over the objects of the world - including Tom 
and Clarence and snow. In Quine's eyes, it is by facilitating such generali- 
zations that the truth predicate earns its keep. 
The utility of the truth predicate is not restricted to generalizations 
couched in terms of  grammatical structure. Similarity of authorship is 
another dimension for generalization in which the truth predicate proves 
practically indispensable. How else, short of reproducing each of  his 
pronouncements, might we advance the thesis that everything the Pope 
says is true? Note that advocacy of  such a generalization in no way com- 
mits us to the further thesis that each of  the Pope's statements is true 
because it is uttered by the Pope. Analogously, and the point is an impor- 
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tant one, the claim that each sentence of a certain grammatical structure 
is true does not carry with it the further claim that the sentences in ques- 
tion are true because they have that structure. 
This said, we can make a first pass at setting out the Quinean program. 
The logician, as the program would have him, is an empirical scientist. 
Like the rest of us, he starts his theorizing already having a substantial 
body of beliefs. And like other scientists his goal is the discovery of 
generalizations and theories. Unlike other scientists, however, the logi- 
cian's generalizations exploit the truth predicate. Noticing that many 
sentences formed by inserting a single declarative into both blanks of 
(1) _ _  or it is not the case that _ _  
are true, he hypothesizes that all are. The hypothesis is a candidate for 
classification as a law of logic. Of course this preliminary picture of the 
logician's project is much too simple. But before adding complications, 
let us note a feature of the project that will be retained as our account 
grows more complex. The justification of logical laws parallels the justifica- 
tion of scientific law. Both logic and science begin with the body of 
beliefs that the theorist takes to be obvious. These support generaliza- 
tions which in turn support particular instances. It is via this latter route, 
for example, that we declare living men to be mortal, and lengthy, multiple 
embedded logical truths to be true. 
We have been talking as though the discovery of laws were the aim of 
the logician and the scientist. But theories, not laws, are the business of 
sophisticated science. The Quinean parallel between natural science and 
logic carries over nicely when our focus turns on theory. The standard 
account of empirical geometry proves a convenient illustration. 'Pure' 
geometry can best be viewed as a physically uninterpreted theory; its 
axioms and theorems make essential use of various predicates (including, 
perhaps, 'x is a line', 'x is a point', 'x is between y and z') to which we 
attach no physical significance. "Applied geometry" gives a physical 
interpretation to the terms, then attempts to test the total theory by 
testing the truth of a sampling of theorems. We need not insist that the 
theorems are to be tested by a straightforward appeal to observation or 
measurement. Rather, the correct applied geometry is the one which, 
combined with further theory, yields the simplest, most explanatory total 
physical theory. 
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Pure geometry finds its analogue in what might be called 'pure logic'. Its 
axioms and theorems contain such predicates as 'x is a sentence', 'x is the 
negation ofy ' ,  'x is the disjunction o fy  and z', etc. The pure theory, how- 
ever, does not tell us which strings of words are sentences, which pairs of 
strings are related as sentence and negation, etc. Thus in pure logical 
theory 'sentence', 'negation' and the rest are (linguistically) uninterpreted. 
The axioms of the pure theory may be stated in a variety of ways. One 
idea, perhaps the simplest, has the axioms spelling out the ways in which 
the truth (or satisfaction) conditions of compound sentences depend on 
the truth (or satisfaction) conditions of their components. A simple 
axiom on this pattern might be 
(2) For any three sentences, $1,5'2, and S, if S is the disjunction 
of Sa and $2, then S is true if and only if $1 is true or $2 is 
true or both $1 and $2 are true. 7 
Among the theorems, of particular interest are those that attribute truth to 
all sentences of a certain structure - say, to every sentence which is a dis- 
junction of a sentence and its own negation - for, when the theory is inter- 
preted it is these sentences that the theory will advance as logical truths. 
Interpreting the theory is the job of a logical grammar. To turn the 
trick a logical grammar must specify which sequences of sounds or 
symbols are to be taken as sentences, and it must attribute to sentences 
structure enough to interprete the otherwise uninterpreted predicates 
employed in the pure theory. That is, it must tell us which sentences are 
disjunctions (and what their disjuncts are), which sentences are negations 
of which, which sentences are universal quantifications, etc. Enriched 
with an appropriate grammar, the logical theory (let us call it an applied 
logic) will entail not only that every disjunction of a sentence with its 
negation is true, but also that 'Tom is tall or it is not the ease that Tom 
is tall' is such a disjunction, and is true. 
How is an applied logic to be tested? Here again the answer parallels 
the one given for applied geometry. We test an applied logic by assessing 
the explanatory and predictive power of the total theory that results from 
meshing an applied logic with the theories of the several sciences. As in 
the ease of applied geometry, there is no need to insist that such an assess- 
ment will be simple or straightforward. 8 
If  we are to make this analogy between the testing of an applied logic 
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and the testing of an applied geometry stick, we must handle a problem 
that arises over the notion of 'meshing' theories when one of the theories 
being meshed is an applied logic. A critic might put the problem as 
follows: "Talk of meshing a pair of non-logical theories (a physical theory 
and an applied geometry, say) is clear enough. Meshing amounts to no 
more than conjoining the postulates of the two theories. The result will 
be a new theory whose theorems include some sentences which were not 
theorems in either of the component theories. And hopefully some of 
these new theorems will be interesting or useful. But what empirical 
purpose is served by conjoining an applied logic to a physical theory? 
Since logical truths are entailed by anything, they were all among the 
theorems of the unsupplemented theory. Adding a logical theory adds 
nothing." 
Part of the critic's complaint is beyond dispute. The scientific utility of 
an applied logic cannot derive simply from the fact that it entails each of 
the logical truths, for this is true of any theory. To understand what logic 
contributes to the overall utility of scientific doctrine we must look else- 
where. The place to focus, I think, is on the situation of what might be 
called the pre-logical scientist - the able and informed practitioner of the 
science of his day who has no explicit logical theory. This is not, of course, 
to say that the imagined scientist is irrational or incapable of reasonable 
argument and inference. Quite to the contrary. I assume that the pre- 
logical scientist can and does reason, argue and infer with considerable 
success. But he has no explicit theory to guide him, no general account of 
what follows deductively from what. Nor need he even be aware of the 
distinction between inductive and deductive argument. So described, the 
prelogical scientist is not an improbable philosophic fiction. Prior to the 
flourishing of logic in the second half of the nineteenth century, scientists 
could hardly have avoided being pre-logical. 
But while the absence of an explicit logical theory will surely not cripple 
a scientist, it will sometimes prove inconvenient. When reasoning gets 
complex it is often unclear whether belief in one sentence, S~, justifies 
belief in another, $2. The theorist who is in doubt about such an infer- 
ence is, we may suppose, equally in doubt the about the conditional sentence 
whose antecedent is $1 and whose consequent is Sv It is just here that an 
explicit logical theory facilitates scientific inference. For when the in- 
ference in question is deductively vMid, the logical theory provides the 
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justification for the conditional. Of course further reasoning will be re- 
quired to show that the conditional follows from the axioms of the applied 
logic. But this is no problem; our theorist can reason well enough. The 
view I am urging is a quite traditional one. An applied logic contributes to 
the sciences by justifying inferences whose validity is otherwise in doubt. 
Less traditional is the Quinean view that the logical theory itself is justified 
just the other way round, via the predictive and explanatory power of the 
theory that results when the inferences sanctioned by the logic are 
countenanced as correct in the rest of the sciences. 
Let us now reflect on a few likely steps the Quinean logician will take 
in an effort to carry out his project. We can skip the complex interplay 
of inspiration and hard work that leads from hints like (1) to something 
approximating the familiar logic of quantifiers and truth functions. 
Imagine rather that our theorist has formulated one or another version of 
pure quantification theory and has a grammar which interprets the theory 
by attributing appropriate structure to some subset of ordinary English 
sentences. Which sentences will these be? The logician can be fairly 
liberal in the expressions his grammar interprets as unstructured or 
atomic predicates, taking care only to avoid non-extensional predicates, 
ambiguous locutions and any others that may lead to falsehood when 
substituted into a valid sentence schema. The situation is different for 
quantifiers and connectives. If we take seriously the idea that the theory 
is to attribute truth to sentences, then, to begin with at least, the grammar 
had best classify as quantifiers and connectives only those cramped and 
fussy locutions of less than ordinary English that are maximally hedged 
against ambiguity. To be avoided are expressions which, singly or strung 
together, might leave their containing sentence true on one reading and 
false on another. Thus, for example, the logician's grammar would do 
well to avoid 'or' as an interpretation of disjunction, opting rather for 
the more cumbersome but less ambiguous ' _ _  or or both'. 
A next obvious move is to reduce the awkwardness of the sentences 
classed as logical truths by abbreviating quantifiers and connectives into 
more manageable form. A more radical step is to introduce into the object 
language expressions intended as interpretations of one or another of the 
constructions employed by the pure logical theory, where the expression 
introduced cannot plausibly be held to abbreviate any expression in the 
pre-existing language. Arguably, the introduction of the horseshoe as an 
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interpretation of the material conditional was just such a move. Perhaps 
even the standard notations for universal and existential quantification 
with their careful attention to scope and cross reference are best thought 
of as similarly reformist in their origin. It is hard to think of any pre- 
existing usage which can be so freely self-embedded without risk of 
serious ambiguity. But arguing over examples is not to the point. The 
division between abbreviation and new coinage is a vague one of no 
particular importance. 9 
It might be objected that there is something illicit about adding 
vocabulary to the object language, that it is akin to tampering with data. 
To fabricate expressions which behave in accordance with our logical 
theory, the complaint continues, is no more legitimate than fabricating 
fake fossils in an effort to confirm an anthropological theory. The protest, 
however, is based on a confusion. Language is not the subject matter of 
the Quinean logician's theory. Indeed, what makes logic unique among 
the sciences is that it has no unique subject matter. It shares vocabulary 
and thus subject matter with each of the sciences, and generalizes across 
them. Thus the logician's introduction of new vocabulary is no more ob- 
jectionable than the analogous move on the part of the physicist or the 
biologist. 
As we have noted, the most convenient interpretation for the construc- 
tions mentioned in pure logical theory will be those carefully hedged or 
even perhaps blatantly artificial expressions that keep ambiguity at a 
minimum. But now let us reflect on sentences constructed from less con- 
trived locutions. Consider, for example, sentences built from common- 
place idioms like 'each', 'some', 'any', 'every', 'all', 'if', etc. Which of 
these are logical truths? The answer I would urge is thatJbr the program 
we have been recounting, none o f  them are. These are the sentences that are 
simply left behind in the gradual evolution of scientific theory. The 
history of science abounds with analogues - terms that were dropped from 
the language of theory with the development of more precise, more readily 
quantified or less ambiguous notions. Thus, for example, 'warm' and 
'cold' dropped out of serious science, to be replaced by talk of tempera- 
ture and amounts of heat. Sentences that speak of warmth are no longer 
taken as truths of physical theory. Similarly, talk of uniform and difform 
motion yielded to talk of velocity and acceleration, and talk of simul- 
taneity (simplieiter) yielded to talk of simultaneity relative to an inertial 
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frame. My claim, then, is that on the Quinean account the logical truths, 
strictly construed, are to be found only among those contrived sentences 
generated by a logical grammar. 
There is no hiding the fact that the view I am trying to pin on the Quinean 
theorist is, in the eyes of many, a radical one. If my reading of the view 
is correct, then, with a few possible exceptions, no sentence in ordinary 
language is a logical truth; and, given the obvious account of entailment 
as logical truth of the appropriate conditional, no sentence in ordinary 
language entails any other. In some places at least, Quine himself seems to 
resist this conclusion. Thus he writes: "This much can be said for the 
linguistic theory of logical truth: we learn logic in learning language." 
Three paragraphs later he adds that the "truths or beliefs [acquired when 
a child learns language] are not limited to logical truths. ''10 On the view 
I am urging, however, knowledge of logic is no more a product of langu- 
age learning than knowledge of physics. In the course of acquiring his 
language the child may well come to know a few snippets of physics, a few 
relatively elementary approximations to physical truths. So too he may 
come to know a few rough approximations to logical truths. But most 
of the truths of physics are not even statable in the language the child 
learns, nor are most of the truths of logic. Quine's words suggest that the 
history of logic can be viewed as a history of making explicit what was 
(tacily?) known all along. The earliest logicians came to know logic 
when they learned their language. But it was not until the time of Frege 
that we had a decent explicit account of what we knew. Plainly such a 
view squares poorly with the central tenet of the program I have been 
calling Quinean. That program views logic as continuous with empirical 
science. The history of logic (like the history of physics or biology) is 
marked by the formulation of laws and theories invoking new concepts 
and using new vocabulary to express them. 
It might well be argued that there is another, less radical strategy, 
equally compatible with the spirit of the Quinean program. Rather than 
maintaining that ordinary language harbors no logical truths, why not try 
to enrich logical grammar? The idea is to have logical grammar generate 
and attribute logical structure to as many sentences of the vernacular as 
possible. By expanding both our logical grammar and our pure logical 
theory, we would aim to specify which natural language sentences are 
logical truths and to give an account of entailment in ordinary language. 
406 S T E P H E N  P. S T I C H  
The strategy has evident attraction, enhanced no doubt by the promise of 
avoiding the claim that there are no logical truths in ordinary language. 
But it is not a proposal that a Quinean logician can endorse. There are a 
pair of reasons. First is the already stressed danger of ambiguity. The 
idioms that in ordinary language approximate the work of regimented 
quantifiers and variables cannot be counted upon to compound into 
complex sentences with only a single reading. The more complex the 
sentence, the greater the chance of trouble. We might try to construct 
the enlarged logical grammar so as to filter out the ambiguous sentences 
in ordinary language, leaving the rest. But to do so would involve con- 
siderable complication of the grammar with no evident gain toward ac- 
complishing the theorist's goals. Moreover, and this is the second reason 
for rejecting the project, given the goals of the Quinean theorist, the 
whole exercise is pointless. His goal is the production of the best theory 
adequate to the needs of empirical science. If this can be done within the 
confines of a regimented fragment of partially fabricated English, there 
is no call to go further. Indeed, the push on the Quinean theorist, like 
that on other empirical theorists, is toward less theory rather than more. 
The physicist records a success when he can construct a theory equal in 
explanatory power to the previously received doctrine but sparcer in 
assumptions. The logician is comparably successful when he can replace 
his current theory with another which, while equally adequate to the 
purposes of science, invokes a simpler logical grammar, making do with 
a sparcer regimented language. There is no cause to protest if the truths 
of logic cannot be formulated in the language of the marketplace, for 
neither can the truths of physics. 
The view we have been elaborating invites a misunderstanding that we 
would do well to guard against. In claiming that there are no logical 
truths or entailments among the idioms neglected by his grammar, the 
logician is not urging that we adopt his newspeak for the purposes of 
daily communication. Nor is he suggesting that serious science can only 
be carried out in the regimented language. The relation between ordinary 
and regimented language is rather to be viewed on the model of the rela- 
tion between everyday language and the most precise and theoretically 
a u  c o u r a n t  scientific idioms. The former is sufficient for scientific dis- 
course so Song as it is obvious to all concerned how the speaker would ex- 
press himself within the confines of the latter. And, failing this, we still 
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need not resort to technical paraphrase if the difference between various 
plausible technical paraphrases makes no difference to the matter at hand. 
Thus the scientist continues to speak of the sun dropping beneath the 
horizon and of distant events occurring simultaneously. Recourse to a 
canonical language, like recourse to technical terminology, is manditory 
only when the alternative is breakdown of communication. 
Some may be tempted to view the ease with which we acquire skill in 
paraphrasing from natural language to canonical as evidence that the 
latter somehow exhibits the underlying structure of the former. We will 
consider this notion of underlying structure in some detail in the sequel. 
Here we need only note that the mere fact that we readily acquire the 
ability to paraphrase hardly supports an inference to underlying struc- 
ture. If it did it would support as well the claim that sentences in the 
technical jargon of the special sciences exhibit the underlying structure 
of more commonplace sentences. For once a science has been mastered 
we show a comparable ability to paraphrase ordinary language into the 
technical jargon of theory. But surely it is absurd to suggest that in con- 
structing a technical vocabulary for a new science we are uncovering the 
buried structure of old sentences. 
Three loose ends remain in this sketch of the Quinean program: a 
warning against a possible misunderstanding, a few reflections on logical 
truth abroad, and some comments on how much truth is logical truth. 
First the misunderstanding. Our persistent assumption has been that 
our imaginary logician will come up with a theory close to familiar quanti- 
fication theory. And, as is no secret, Quine himself has long championed 
quantification theory as logic enough for empirical science. But this view 
is quite independent of the program I have been calling Quinean. The 
program is a specification of goals, an answer to the question: What is it 
to get a logical theory right? And, of course, it could turn out that the 
theory which best fulfills the goals we have sketched might be in funda- 
mental ways different from the standard logic of truth functions and 
quantifiers. 
Thus far everything we have said about logical truth has been domestic. 
We have imagined how a theorist goes about formulating his theory in his 
own language; and we have imagined that his language is English. But 
what is to be said of logical truth in other tongues? How do we discover 
the logical truths in French or Old Norse? In principle, I think, the answer 
408 S T E P H E N  P. S T I C H  
is simple. The logical truths in exotic tongues are just the sentences whose 
translations in English are logical truths. And if our standards of transla- 
tion are decently high, there will, in all likelihood, be no logical truths in 
Old Norse or everyday French. This should not be surprising, for neither 
are there any Old Norse sentences whose English translations are the 
abstruse truths of recent physical theory. To state the truths of logic (or of 
physics) in French or in Old Norse requires the same sort of warping of 
the vernacular that was required for English. Should it be protested that 
the notion of translation is uncomfortably obscure, I would be the first 
to agree. But I do not think there is any special problem with the transla- 
tion of logical truths. Logic abroad is no less scrutable than biology or 
physics. 
Finally there is the problem of drawing boundaries. Given a body of 
presumed truth, how much of it is to be regarded as logical truth, and how 
much as belonging to the special sciences or to the scattered and unsystem- 
atic reservoir of commonplace truth? It might be thought that the matter 
could be settled by noting how much of our theory made use of the truth 
predicate since, as we have seen, such use is among the hallmarks of logic. 
This idea loses its attraction when we realize that any fully explicit theory 
can be reworked so as to invoke the truth predicate. But if the boundary 
separating logical truths from their fellows proves hard to draw in a non- 
arbitrary way, the program we have sketched provides some solace. It 
suggests that the boundary is arbitrary and also unimportant. Drawing 
the line is a project of a piece with saying where physics stops and chemis- 
try starts, a job more pressing for deans than for theorists. Of course, for 
the most part we have little trouble deciding whether a given body of 
doctrine is plausibly considered a part of logic. Our intuitions, I would 
speculate, rest in part on precedent and in part on the feeling that resort 
to the truth predicate should be a last resort. Other things equal, the less 
logical truth the better. Where the two principles conflict, there is no 
evident way of resolving the question, and no reason to worry if it remains 
unresolved. 
I I I  
The project which, by my lights, is the principal alternative to the Quinean 
program would develop a theory of logical form on the model of the 
theories produced by generative grammarians, n Indeed, some of the 
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programs' advocates view a theory of logical form as a proper part of a 
generative grammar. A few observations on the goals of grammatical 
theory will prove a convenient opening for our discussion of what I will 
call the semantic program. 
What 1 will call a descriptive grammar aims to be an idealized theory of 
linguistic intuitions. Linguistic intuitions are simply the pre-theoretic (or 
'intuitive') judgments that, with a bit of prodding, speakers can be brought 
to make about the linguistic properties and relations of the expressions 
in their language. A completed theory of linguistic intuition would, as a 
minimum, be expected to predict accurately just which judgments a com- 
petent speaker will make. A more ambitious theory might go on to ex- 
plore the psychological mechanisms that underlie a speaker's capacity 
to judge expressions as he does. A linguist's grammar will do neither. 
Rather it is intended as a central sub-component in some larger theory 
which can be expected to predict intuitions accurately. The idea is that a 
theory predicting actual intuitions is best built in pieces, one piece speci- 
fying an idealized class of intuitions, and the other pieces explaining the 
deviation between idealized intuitions and those actually reported. Some 
of the deviations, we would expect, are due to general limitations on 
memory. Others might be best explained by psychological factors as yet 
poorly understood. As with any idealized theory, descriptive grammar re- 
quires a certain amount of informed speculation. The theorist will some- 
times be required to rely on dubious intuitions or even to ignore appar- 
ently negative data with the hope that as the theory develops things will 
fall into place. 12 
Now the starting point of the semantic program is the observation that 
in addition to intuitions about syntactic properties (like grammaticality 
or syntactic ambiguity) and relations (like the active-passive relation or 
the relation between a verb and its subject) speakers also have tolerably 
uniform intuitions about semantic properties (like analyticity) and rela- 
tions (like entailment and synonymy). Thus we may try to construct an 
idealized theory of semantic intuitions parallel to our idealized theory of 
syntactic intuitions. Or, going a step further, we might try for an inte- 
grated theory aimed at handling both syntactic and semantic intuitions 
together. 
Before setting out to build a theory, the theorist would do well to 
decide just which sorts of intuitions are 'semantic' intuitions and thus 
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which sorts of intuitions his theory aims to capture. Unhappily there is 
no complete standard list. But, on reflection, this need not seem a diffi- 
culty. For  as long as there is fair agreement that (most of) a certain set of 
intuitions are the proper domain for the semantic program, we can treat 
the inclusion of  any other types of putatively semantic intuitions as an 
empirical problem. Such intuitions are to be treated as semantic if, 
without undue complications, they can be handled by the theory designed 
to handle the less questionable sorts of  intuitions. Among this latter 
group, intuitions of  entailment will surely play a prominent role, as will 
intuitions of  synonymy, of contradictoriness and of semantic ambiguity. 
Some would add intuitions of analyticity and perhaps intuitions of  logical 
truth, either as a subset of the analytic sentences or as a distinct class. 
It is by virtue of the first and last items on this brief list that the semantic 
program's advocates lay claim to the notion of  logical form. For  surely, 
they maintain, a theory detailing logical truths and entailments in a 
language is a theory of  logical form for that language. 
Thus far we have been talking as though semantic intuitions were judg- 
ments about certain properties and relations of sentences. But matters are 
more complicated. In many cases our intuitions of entailment, for 
example, cannot be construed as judgments that one sentence entails 
another. Rather they are judgments that in one sense (or on a certain 
interpretation or reading) a given sentence entails a second (on one 
reading). Thus we intuit that in one sense 'Some banks were submerged' 
entails 'Some financial institutions were under water'. While in another 
sense it does not. And on one reading 'Every girl was kissed by some boy' 
entails 'One boy kissed all of the girls'. These are the intuitions the seman- 
tic theorist aims to predict. To turn the trick, the most obvious strategy 
is to identify senses with suitable theoretical constructs within a descrip- 
tive grammatical theory. In the 'interpretative semantics' of  Katz, 
Chomsky and others these are semantically interpreted underlying phrase 
markers. In 'generative semantics' they would appear to be sentences in 
some vastly enriched version of the languages designed by intensional 
logicians. In either case the entities serving as senses are mapped (usually 
many-many) to sentences in the language at hand. Entailment is then 
defined over senses. The idea is to have one sense entail a second only 
when speakers intuit that a sentence mapped to the first entails (on some 
reading) a sentence mapped to the second. Synonymy and analyticity are 
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handled similarly - all of  this, of  course, within the boundaries of ideali- 
zation. Ambiguity and anomaly are proper properties of sentences. Those 
sentences intuited to be ambiguous are mapped to more than one sense; 
those intuited to be anomalous are mapped to none. The several semantic 
properties and relations are themselves nomologically linked. Thus, for 
example, it is to be expected that for each ambiguous sentence there will 
be two or more additional sentences each synonymous with the ambigu- 
ous sentence (on a reading) but commonly not synonymous with each 
other (on any reading). 
Evidently senses construed in this way are plausibly viewed as theoret- 
ical entities of  a growing psychological theory. And it is natural to wonder 
how senses might play a part  in a broader psychological theory aspiring 
to more than prediction and explanation of syntactic and semantic intui- 
tions. Harman has proposed that senses might serve as the objects of 
belief and propositional attitudes, that believing, wanting, hoping and 
such might be taken as relations between persons and senses. 13 This is 
not the place to debate the merits of Harman's  suggestion. But should it 
prove viable, it might suggest yet another move more central to our cur- 
rent concerns. The basic idea is this. If  senses are the objects of beliefs, 
then perhaps we can use data about beliefs to test conslusions about entail- 
ment. More specifically, suppose it were discovered that generally persons 
who believe sense S~ believe sense Sz (but not conversely). Is this not 
positive evidence for the hypothesis that $1 entails $2 (but not conversely)? 
The answer, I think, is yes and no. Yes, if belief in $2 is not generally ac- 
companied by belief in $I, this is some reason to think that $2 does not 
entail $1. And no, if belief in $1 is generally accompanied by belief in $2 
this is scant evidence that the former entails the latter. Generally people 
who believe that one rabbit exists believe that two do. But surely the sense 
that is the object of  the first belief does not entail the sense that is the ob- 
ject of the second. Entailment, as the semantic program construes it, is 
tighter than a nomological connection between beliefs. The evidence that 
decides between the weaker and the stronger connection is data about 
intuitions. An analogous point may be made about analyticity and logical 
truth. A semantic theorist may well take disbelief as evidence against the 
analyticity of a sense, though he could hardly take belief as evidence in 
favor. 
In our account of the semantic program the notion of a sense has taken 
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on a prominent role. Its prominence may lead some to hope that the 
results of a Quinean theorist might be merged with the results of a 
semantic theorist, indeed that the two programs might probe to be differ- 
ent paths to the same end point. For, it might be argued, the postulation 
of senses and the construction of a canonical language share a common 
motivation. In each case we seek linguistic structures which, while re- 
lated to ordinary sentences, do not share the ambiguity of ordinary 
sentences. And in each case it is these structures over which entailment 
and logical truth are defined. The thought that the product of a Quinean 
theorist's endeavor might be a semantic theory is reinforced by the 
generative semanticist's proposal to identify senses (or deep structures) 
with sentences in an enriched regimented language. Could it not turn out 
that the regimented language of generative semantics ideally suits the 
purposes of the Quinean theorist ? And if so, could it not also turn out that 
the entailment relation the semantic theorists defines over senses is the 
same relation that the Quinean defines over regimented sentences? 
Indeed it could. Stranger things, as they say, have happened. But there 
are a pair of reasons for skepticism. One centers on the intended scope of 
the two sorts of theories, the other on claims to truth. Let us focus first 
on scope. In writing a descriptive grammar an empirical linguist is con- 
cerned to describe as much of the language as he can. If  his theory neglects 
some corner of the language, his theory is incomplete; the larger the 
corner, the greater the defect. The same is true for the semantic theorist. 
His theory is no less decriptive than the empirical grammarian's. If  there 
is an area of the object language for which speakers have intuitions, and if 
his theory does not describe them, then his theory is incomplete. Not so 
for the Quinean theorist. For his purposes less is more. Other things (read: 
scientific utility) being equal, the more limited the logical grammar, the 
better. Of course it might happen that the Quinean theorist could get 
away with no less a canonical language than suits the needs of the semantic 
theorist, or, taking the opposite perspective, that the semantic theorist 
needs no more senses than the Quinean theorist's canonical language 
provides. But surely such a coincidence would be little short of miraculous. 
The point about truth begins from the observation that the Quinean 
theorist is committed to the truth of the sentences he labels 'logically 
true'. He has as much reason to believe them as he has to believe the 
sentences of received physical theory. Indeed, it is much the same reason. 
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The semantic theorists need make no similar commitment to the sentences 
(or senses) he labels 'logically true' or 'analytic'. His concern is to provide 
an idealized description of intuition and if the proposal to take senses as 
the objects of belief pans out he may be committed to the claim that his 
subjects believe analytic senses to be true. But nothing in his theory com- 
mits the semantic theolist to agreeing with his subjects. Though obvious 
enough, this fact is sometimes obscured by the otherwise unobjection- 
able practice of theorists using themselves and their colleagues as the 
principal source of data for a semantic theory. To see how all this relates 
to the prospective merger of the two programs, imagine that at a given 
stage in the evolution of a Quinean theory its account of entailment, 
logical truth and the rest matches substantially the then current account of 
the identically labeled notions advanced by semantic theorists. Were such 
a situation to arise there is every reason to believe that it would be un- 
stable. For suppose that on-going research among Quineans turned up 
an alternative theory whose overall scientific utility was pretty clearly 
superior. Plainly such a discovery would not alter the intuitions and 
beliefs of the linguistic community at large. Thus the accepted Quinean 
theory would change while the accepted semantic theory would not. 
And, of course, the story can be turned around, imagining a gradual 
evolution of the vernacular and with it a gradual evolution of intuitions, 
provoking no change in Quinean theory. 
The observations of the preceding paragraph have implications beyond 
the potential merger of the Quinean and semantic programs. They point to 
a certain systematic misrepresentation in our account of the semantic 
program, a misrepresentation that follows the lead of the usual presenta- 
tions of semantic theories. The problem is the semantic theorist's choice 
of the terms 'logical truth', 'entailment', 'analytic sentence' and some 
others to label the classes of sentences and the relations among sentences 
specified by his theory. The misrepresentation is clearest in the case of 
'logical truth' for, as we have lately noted, there is no reason to believe 
that the sentences so labeled in semantic theory are true. Similarly, 
'analytic' is standardly parsed as 'truth by virtue of meaning'. But the 
semantic theorist has no reason to believe the sentences he calls 'analytic' 
are true at all, let alone true by virtue of meaning. Nor has he any argu- 
ment that as he uses the word 'entailment' truths entail only truths. 
At issue is more than a matter of suitable terminology. What is at stake 
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is not the labels the semantic theorist chooses but the truth of the sentences 
selected, however labeled. The semantic theorist uses evidence about 
intuitions (and perhaps about beliefs) to build a theory which entails 
that certain sentences are logical truths. If, in this theory, 'logical truth' is 
viewed as a technical term in which 'truth' occurs syncategorematically, 
there is no complaint. There is cause for protest only if the semantic 
theorist goes on to claim that his 'logical truths' are true. To substantiate 
the claim he needs an argument that data about intuitions and beliefs 
can yield conclusions about truth. In the absence of such an argument - 
and I see little prospect of a serious argument being constructed - we must 
conclude that semantic theory, as here construed, is not a theory of  logical 
form at all. It tells us nothing about logical truth and nothing about en- 
tailment, save in the Pickwickean sense in which logical truths need not 
be true and entailment need not preserve truth. 
To endorse this conclusion is not to patronize semantic theory. Semantic 
theory, as here characterized, falls squarely within the boundaries of 
psychology; it is that branch of psychology concerned to describe and 
explain a complex system of judgments and intuitions characteristic of  
natural language users. And if, as suggested, semantic theory should 
prove to be systematically related to the study of beliefs and other propo- 
sitional attitudes, the combined total theory would still plainly count as 
psychology. 
There is no novelty in the observation that a theory of semantic intui- 
tions (with or without ties to a theory of belief) sanctions no inference to 
the truth of sentences favored by intuition. 14 Yet few who pursue the se- 
mantic program have taken it to heart. Part of the blame, I suspect, can be 
laid to one or another version of a bad argument invoking truth condi- 
tions. In outline the argument goes like this: by observing patterns of 
belief and disbelief (or of assent and dissent) we can determine the way 
certain constructions affect truth conditions. Suppose, for example, that a 
given construction in some exotic tongue works by adding the word 'neg' 
to the beginning of another sentence, thereby forming a new sentence. 
And suppose further that speakers commonly believe (or assent to) a sen- 
tence S when and only when they disbelieve (or dissent from) 'neg'---S, 
and that they believe 'neg'---S when they disbelieve S. This, the argument 
holds, is enough to establish that the 'neg' construction functions logically 
as negation, or, more precisely, that 
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(2) ($1) (Sz) if $2 = 'neg'---S1 then $1 is true if and only i f S  2 is 
not true. 
Suppose now that we find another construction, the 'dis' construction form- 
ing a sentence from two others, where the pattern of belief and disbelief 
indicates that the constructiort functions as inclusive disjunction, i.e. that 
(3) (S) (S 0 (Sz) if S = ' d i s '~  S~ --- $2 then S is true if and only if 
$1 is true or $2 is true or both. 
From (2) and (3) we can conclude that every sentence of the form 
'dis' --- S --- 'neg' ,-- S is true. Plainly, the argument concludes, psycho- 
logical evidence, evidence about speakers' beliefs, can yield conclusions 
about the truth of sentences in the speakers' language, though the sentences 
in question are not sentences about speakers' psychological states. Indeed, 
the sentences are logical truths. 
The trouble with this argument comes in the inference from evidence 
about beliefs to the conclusions (2) and (3). Soberly viewed, the inference 
is a simple non-sequitur. The imagined evidence may support generaliza- 
tions like 
(SO ($2) if $2 = 'neg'---S1 then $1 is believed true if and only 
if $2 is not believed true. 
(2') 
and 
(3 ') (S) (SO (Sz) if S = 'dis'---$1--" $2, then S is believed true if 
and only if $1 is believed true or $2 is beBeved true or both. 
But without further premises there is no argument from (2') and (3') to 
(2) and (3). We are back where we started, looking for an argument from 
belief to truth. 
Another version of this untenable argument casts it in terms of transla- 
tion. Here the argument goes something like this: In the case imagined 
two paragraphs back, the evidence about beliefs suffices to show that 
'neg' is best translated into English as 'not '  and 'dis' is best translated as 
'or'. So if Tr(S) is the English translation of sentence S in Exotic, 
' n o t ' ~ T r ( S )  will be the translation of ' neg '~S .  And Tr(S) is true if and 
only if 'not'---Tr(S) is not true. Finally, assuming that a sentence is 
true in Exotic if and only if its translation into English is true, we can 
infer back to (2). Analogous reasoning yields (3). So we can get from 
evidence about beliefs to conclusions about truth after all. 
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This version of the argument helps itself to a healthy serving of assump- 
tions about translation and the evidence for translation. But even if we 
leave these assumptions unchallenged, the argument will not do what it 
purports to. For central to the argument is a premise about truth condi- 
tions of English sentences. This is the assumption that for any Exotic S, 
Tr(S) is true if and only if 'not'.-.Tr(S) is not. It has surely not been 
shown that this premise can be supported by evidence about belief or 
intuition. On the view I am urging, the premise rests squarely on the sort 
of support a Quinean might offer. Evidence about belief may support 
conclusions about translation, but we have found no argument that it will 
support conclusions about truth or truth conditions. 
One might well wonder why anyone should suppose it at all plausible 
that evidence about belief and intuition would support conclusions about 
truth and truth conditions. The answer, I think, traces back to a failure 
of nerve at the very beginning of modern empiricism. The classical empi- 
ricists were not thorough-going in their claim that all knowledge arose 
from experience. In one guise or another they exempted certain privileged 
sorts of knowledge, including knowledge of logic. With Kant the explana- 
tion of certain sorts of a priori knowledge came to rest on the notion of 
analyticity, which was itself explained in terms drawn from the study of 
language. And in the Vienna circle's sophisticated empiricism this idea 
grew to a full-blown linguistic 'explanation' of all a priori knowledge. 
Thus if beliefs, intuitions (and linguistic behavior) are the principal data 
for linguistics, they must be the principal data for a theory of logical form 
as well. Underlying the present paper is the view that all of this has been 
a monumental mistake. I have urged that elaborating an account of 
logical truth and entailment is no part of a linguists' proper job. The fact 
that a sentence is a logical truth is no more a fact about language than 
the fact that a sentence is a physical truth. Recognizing this would serve 
to direct linguists toward more profitable pursuits while yielding a 
clearer picture of the place of logic among the sciences. 
The University of Michigan 
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L O G I C A L  FORM AND N A T U R A L  L A N G U A G E  417 
1 A conspicuous exception is Donald Davidson in whose writings these questions come 
in for considerable attention. 
2 Cf. my 'Davidson's Semantic Program',  to appear, 
3 See, for example, 'Truth by Convention'  and 'Carnap and Logical Truth ' ,  both  re-  
printed in W. V. Quine. The Ways of Paradox (New York, 1966); Word and Object 
(Cambridge, Mass., 1960); Philosophy of  Logic (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1970). 
4 Philosophy of Logic, p. 35. 
5 Cf. S. P. Stich, 'Dissonant Notes on the Theory of Reference', Nous IV (1970) 4. 
It is easy enough to capture this informal idea more precisely. Suppose we have a 
theory whose theorems include (perhaps infinitely many) sentences of the form: 
S is true 
w h e r e ' S '  is replaced by some standard name of a sentence. We may then append to the 
theory an infinite number  of axioms each of the form: 
S is true if and only i f p  
w h e r e ' S '  is replaced by any standard name of a sentence and 'p '  is replaced by the 
sentence itself. Now each sentence whose truth was entailed by the original theory will 
itself be a theorem of the enriched theory. Logical theory, as described below, is to be 
viewed as tacitly enriched with just such an axiom schema. 
7 There are, of course, other ways of presenting a logical theory. One idea is to begin 
by specifying that every instance of certain sentence schemata is true, then add certain 
transformations on schemata which preserve this property. Another  is to pair sentence 
schemata with set theoretic sentences, adding that every instance of a given schema is 
true if and only if the associated set theoretic sentence is true. The analogy I am urging 
between geometry and logic can, I think, be pressed equally well for logical theories 
developed in these ways. 
s In a number  of passages Quine seems to urge quite a different idea on how a 
logical theory is to be tested. (Cf., for example, 'Carnap and Logical Truth' ,  pp. 105-6 
in The Ways of Paradox.) The alternative suggestion would have a theorist test the theo- 
rems of an applied logic against the pre-theoretic store of beliefs he takes to be obvious. I f  
the theory is correct, each sentence it classifies as a logical truth must either seem obvious- 
ly true to the theorsit or at least must be potentially obvious, i.e. he must be able to bring 
himself to see it as obvious via a series of steps each of which is in turn obviously 
acceptable. However, this account of the testing of an applied logical theory will not 
fit comfortably with the program I have been calling Quinean. There are a pair of 
reasons. The first is a practical problem. In most applied logical theories likely to be of 
interest there will be infinitely many sentences classified as logical truths. Thus there 
will be logical truths containing more than n words, for any natural number n. And it 
is hard to see what the notion of potential obviousness comes to for sentences that  
would take more than a lifetime to read. Second, and more important,  is the fact that 
on the suggested account of the verification of a logical theory, the central Quinean 
analogy between empirical science and logic breaks down. An applied geometry is not  
to be tested by the intuitive obviousness of its theorems, but by the predictive and ex- 
planatory power of the theory that results when the geometry is joined with physics. 
And if the axioms and theorems of the best geometry are neither obvious nor  potentially 
obvious, obviousness be damned. 
9 The logician's introduction of wholly new vocabulary into his object language serves 
to reinforce the observation in the previous footnote concerning the justification of 
418 STEPHEN P. STICH 
logical theory. Insofar as logical truths make essential use of self-consciously artificial 
vocabulary, we cannot imagine the logician testing his theory by appeal to the body of 
sentences pre-theoretically believed true. If logical truths are coeval with logical theory, 
they could be neither accepted or rejected pre-theoretically. So, insofar as the output 
of a logical grammar departs from pre-existing usage, justification must take the in- 
direct route, weighing the general empirical utility of the proposed logical theory, new 
vocabulary and all. 
10 Philosophy of Logic, pp. 100-101. 
11 The program I have in mind is embraced fairly explicitly in, for example, J. J. Katz 
and J. A. Fodor, 'The Structure of Semantic Theory', Language 39 2 (1963); J. J. Katz 
and P. Postal, An Integrated Theory of Linguistic Descriptions (Cambridge, Mass., 
1964); N. Chomsky, Aspects of the Theory of Syntax (Cambridge, Mass., 1965); 
J. J. Katz, Semantic Theory (New York, 1972). I would argue that it is also the program 
behind such works as G. Lakoff, 'On Generative Semantics', in L. Jacobovits and 
D. Steinberg (eds.), Semantics: An Interdisciplinary Reader (Cambridge, 1970), and 
G. Lakoff, 'Linguistics and Natural Logic', Synthese 22 (1970). 
12 For more on this view of grammar, see my 'Grammar, Psychology and Indeter- 
minacy', Journal of Philosophy LXIX (1972) 22; 'What Every Grammar Does', 
Philosophia 3 (1973) 1; and 'Competence and Indeterminacy', in Testing Linguistic 
Hypotheses: Papers From the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Linguistics Group 
Third Annual Symposium (ed. byDavid Cohen and Jessica R. Wirth), Washington, D.C., 
1975. 
13 Cf. Gilbert H. Harman, Thought (Princeton, N.J., 1973), Ch. V. 
14 Essentially the same point is made in Quine's reply to Grice and Strawson, Wordand 
Object, pp. 66 ft. 
